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Abstract—Audience response systems, also known as clickers,
are used at many academic institutions to offer active learning
environments. Since these systems are used to administer graded
assignments, and sometimes even exams, it is crucial to assess
their security. Our work seeks to exploit and document potential
vulnerabilities of clickers. For this purpose, we use software
defined radios to perform eavesdropping attacks on an audience
response system in production. The results of our study demon-
strate that clickers are easily exploitable. We build a prototype
and show that it is practically possible to covertly steal answers
from a peer or even the entire classroom, with high levels of
confidence. As a result of this study, we discourage using clickers
for high-stake assessments, unless manufacturers provide proper
security protection.
Keywords—Signal processing, clicker, GNU Radio, HackRF
One.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many institutions employ Turning Technologies’ Response
Cards [8], also known as clickers, to create active learning
environments and encourage students’ participation in their
classes. Clickers are wireless devices that let instructors poll
students for purposes such as taking attendance, and adminis-
tering quizzes and/or surveys.
Institutions offering classes with clickers include Har-
vard, Northwestern, Johns Hopkins, University of Colorado at
Boulder, Ohio State University, University of California, and
Washington State University [7]. Some educational institutions
go so far as to administer clicker-based exams. For example,
University of Maryland of Baltimore County shows evidence
of having administered these types of exams in the past. A post
on the university’s Division of Information Technology page
includes a quotation of a student expressing favor for these
exams, commenting “I liked taking the exam on the clickers
because we had our own exam booklet in front of us and could
go at our own pace. I also liked getting my grade back right
away.” [9]
The popularity of clickers raises the question of whether
these devices are actually secure. In particular, since clickers
transmit over radio frequencies, is it possible for a student or
another party to sniff answers submitted by other students? By
sniffing, we mean the act of eavesdropping communication in
order to extract confidential information.
In this paper, we answer this question in the affirmative.
We build a prototype of a sniffer using the HackRF One
software defined radio platform [4]. Our implementation has
an accuracy above 90% if the sniffer is located less than 10
feet away from a clicker and above 70% if the sniffer is less
than 20 feet away. Using information provided by the sniffer,
a student can cheat in various ways, e.g., by finding out the
most commonly submitted answer or by looking at the answer
submitted by a particular student (assuming the clicker ID of
that student is known).
Our project builds on earlier work by Travis Goodspeed [3]
and Taylor Killian [5], who noticed that clickers do not encrypt
data while communicating. They also determined the structure
of packets sent by clickers. However, their implementation is
hardware-based. The attacker uses the nRF24L01/nRF24L01+
radio chips, which are similar to the nRF24LE1 chip used by
clickers. Instead, our implementation is software-based.
It is crucial to emphasize that completing such a project
with the HackRF One, or any other software defined radio, is a
significantly more difficult task. Software defined radios do not
offer many of the luxuries which Goodspeed and Killian bene-
fited from, when they worked with the nRF24L01/nRF24L01+
radio chips. Some of these luxuries include automated demod-
ulation, which is the act of extracting information from a signal
wave, automated filtering, which is the process of removing
noise or unwanted information from a signal, and automated
error-handling of abnormal signal behavior. Instead, a software
defined radio requires software implementation of the previ-
ously mentioned tasks. Despite this downfall, the reward is
the versatility of the HackRF One and other software defined
radios. They are not device-specific and, once mastered, are
modifiable to function with various hardware and signals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
describe the software and hardware tools used in our imple-
mentation. Next, we provide details of the implementation
of the sniffer. Then, we present experimental results before
concluding the paper.
II. THE TOOLS
A. The HackRF One
The specific software defined radio used in this project to
assess the security of Turning Technologies’ Response Cards
is Scott Gadgets’ HackRF One (see Fig. 1). The HackRF
One [4] is a hardware device able to capture radio signals
via an antenna. It contains a wide-band front end which
is able to process frequencies ranging from 1 MHz to 6
GHz. As this range is very large (for comparison, the FM
radio broadcast range is only 87.9 MHz to 107.9 MHz), the
computational power required to convert between analog and
digital signals is expensive. Thus, the HackRF One converts
Fig. 1. The diagram above offers a graphical representation, in the form of
a flow diagram, of the HackRF One.
this range to an intermediate frequency range of 2.3 GHz to 2.7
GHz. The analog-to-digital/digital-to-analog converter models
this received signal as a series of complex numbers. The
control unit streams this data into another device, oftentimes
a computer operating on a Linux-based operating system.
This stream of data can then be modified and analyzed with
software. Additionally, a crucial specification of the HackRF
is its maximum bandwidth support of 20 MHz.
B. GNU Radio
With the HackRF One offering the hardware support for
this project, software GNU Radio [2] is used to perform
signal processing and analysis on the digital input received
via USB port. As mentioned, this digital input is a series
of complex numbers. GNU Radio is packaged with a user-
friendly interface known as GNU Radio Companion, often
abbreviated GRC.
GRC features a variety of graphical tools in the form of
building blocks available for the user to construct a circuit-
like flow diagram. A complete flow diagram can be used
for several purposes, a few being: transmitting signals using
a file source or a random value generator, receiving signals
and demodulating for sake of playing audio or gathering
data, or recording and replaying signals to visually analyze
them using one of GRC’s many plots. GNU Radio offers
the software equivalent of nearly every hardware tool used
in signal processing, making it an extremely powerful tool for
this project.
C. Wi-Spy
Although only briefly used in this project, the Wi-Spy
compensates for the HackRF One’s comparatively small band-
width. The Wi-Spy [10] is a USB-compatible 2.4 GHz spec-
trum analyzer with an internal antenna. Whereas the HackRF
One has a maximum bandwidth of 20 MHz, unable to view
the entire 2.4 GHz band, the Wi-Spy is able to do so. This
is a critical frequency range because the clicker is said to
operate within this range (more details regarding the clicker
are explained later in the paper).
The Wi-Spy is simple to use; the device operates in con-
junction with the Chanalyzer 2.1 software, which launches a
graphical representation of the entire 2.4 GHz band, displaying
which frequencies on the spectrum contain high amounts
of activity. This is especially useful when confirming the
operation range of the clicker and selecting a channel within
this bandwidth to conduct the product on for optimal results, as
channels with consistently high activity affect results by adding
excess noise to the signal. Note that this spectrum analyzer
does not interact with either GNU Radio or the HackRF One
in any way.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A sniffing attack requires filtering the signal, demodulating
it with the correct modulation scheme, synchronizing clocks
with the signal’s data rate, transforming the demodulated
signal into a binary data stream (data consisting of 0 and 1
values), and then interpreting the binary data stream in order
to discover packets sent by the clicker. In order to begin
implementation of the sniffing attack, it is important to confirm
the clicker’s specifications found on radio chip manufacturer
Nordic’s website [6]. Note that the clicker’s chip model is the
nRF24LE1.
A. Confirming Operation Frequency
The first step is to browse through data sheets for spec-
ifications regarding the nRF24LE1 radio chip, and then set
up tests to either confirm or deny said specifications. The first
specification that should be observed is the operation frequency
of the clicker. It is crucial to begin with this, as it is impossible
to test other specifications if the clicker’s signal cannot be
located on the frequency spectrum. To ensure that the device
does indeed operate in the 2.4 GHz spectrum, the spectrum
analyzer Wi-Spy is used. If the clicker operates in this range,
an activity spike should occur when the clicker’s keypad is
pressed. After a brief test period of transmitting signals on
several channels of the clicker, it is observed that the clicker
does operate in the 2.4 GHz range.
B. Determining Channel Implementation
Not only that, but a consistent pattern is also observed
during the experiment; each of the clicker’s respective channels
creates activity on the frequency 2.4xx GHz, with xx represent-
ing the channel number. For example, transmitting a signal on
channel 19 creates an activity spike at 2.419 GHz (see Fig. 2).
Additionally, it is found that the minimum channel value
is 1 and the maximum channel value is 82, confirmed by both
physical attempt and the Federal Communication Commission
website [1] (a site that holds the data for many government-
approved radio-dependent devices). Knowing this in conjunc-
tion with Turning Technologies advertising that the clicker has
82 individual channels, alongside Nordic advertising that the
nRF24LE1 operates at either 1 or 2 MHz bandwidth, it can
be logically assumed that the clicker operates with 1 MHz
bandwidth.
To reiterate what is uncovered thus far, it is now known
that the clicker operates in the 2.401 GHz to 2.482 GHz range,
with each channel in the 1 to 82 range corresponding to its
respective frequency, i.e. channel 40 is 2.440 GHz, and each
channel having a 1 MHz bandwidth.
C. Determining Modulation Scheme
With knowledge of the clicker’s operation frequency, trans-
mission bandwidth, and channel-to-frequency correlation, the
next high-priority specification to confirm is the modulation
scheme. Although more specifications and assumptions need
to be confirmed, it is essential to know how the signals carry
data in order to begin implementation.
Thus, the clicker’s modulation scheme is discovered via the
manufacturer Nordic’s website [6] and is found to be GFSK
(Gaussian frequency shift keying) modulation, a modulation
scheme very similar to FSK (frequency shift keying). This
modulation scheme is confirmed by testing the Quadrature
Demod, a GNU Radio block used for GFSK/FSK modulation,
which succcessfully outputs a demodulated signal (see Fig.
3). The significance of the demodulated wave is discussed in
the following paragraphs. Now using this knowledge of the
clicker’s modulation scheme, the clicker’s data rate (baud rate)
can be tested.
D. Calculating Baud Rate
Observing the data sheet once again reveals that the
nRF24LE1 radio chip is programmable to either transmit data
at a rate of either 1000 kbps or 250 kbps. Also knowing
the modulation scheme, operation frequency and bandwidth,
and the likelihood of the signal containing a 01010101 8-
bit preamble (both because this is a common preamble and
because this is found in the data sheet), the task of discovering
the data rate/baud rate becomes less intimidating. Using these
pieces of information, the signal can preliminarily be demod-
ulated (see Fig. 3). Because it is assumed that the preamble
is a 01010101 sequence, looking at the time stamps of the
demodulated signal’s peaks (binary 1) and valleys (binary 0)
reveal the rate at which data is transmitted, i.e. the baud rate.
It can thus be confirmed that the baud rate is 1000 kbps.
E. Constructing the Implementation
Now, knowing the baud rate, a GNU Radio software im-
plementation can be created (see Fig. 4). The overall function
of this implementation is as follows. The Osmocom Source
generates a stream of complex numbers based on the signal
that the HackRF One receives via its antenna. This stream of
Fig. 2. The screen capture above shows an activity spike at 2.419 GHz
resulting from a using the clicker on channel 19.
Fig. 3. The screen capture of the demodulated signal. Looking at the peak
and the valley, it can be seen that the time between a binary 1 and a binary 0 in
the preamble is approximately 1 microsecond. Thus, if it takes 1 microsecond
to transmit 1 bit, the baud rate is 1000 kbps.
numbers is passed through a Low Pass Filter in order
to decrease the amount of excess noise. The Cutoff Freq
is set to 650 kHz and the Transition Width is set to
350 kHz. The combination of these two parameters creates a
power decline for signals received outside of ± 500 kHz range,
thus filtering out all signals aside from the desired 1 MHz
bandwidth clicker transmission channel.
The filtered stream of data is now passed through a
Complex to Mag2 block and then into a WX GUI Scope
Sink; the purpose of this is to view when the signal pulses.
That same filtered stream of data is also passed through
a Quadrature Demod block which transforms the mod-
ulated signal into a demodulated wave which can be rec-
ognized as binary data, where high values (usually peaks)
can be considered 1 and low values (usually valleys) can
be considered 0. The next four blocks, the Add Const,
Multiply Const, Clock Recovery MM, and Binary
Slicer slightly modify and then decipher the demodulated
wave, producing a binary stream.
The Clock Recovery MM block syncs clocks with the
transmission signal, so that each bit transmitted by the clicker
is deciphered properly. Since the clicker’s baud rate is previ-
ously determined to be 1000 kbps, the Omega parameter of
this block is calculated to be 2. This calculation is performed
by taking the sample rate, 2 mega samples per second, and
dividing by the baud rate. 2Msps/1Mbps = 2s/b, i.e. 2 samples
per bit. The Binary Slicer then selects 0 on the y-axis as a
threshold. Since every two samples is a transmitted bit, a clock
tick occurs every two samples. Thus, for each clock tick, the
bit is recognized as a 1 if the wave is above the threshold and
recognized as a 0 if the wave is below the threshold. The Add
Const and Multiply Const blocks improve this process
by centering the signal and amplifying it. Lastly, this stream
of deciphered bits is pushed into the File Sink.
The only remaining step is to create an implementation
Fig. 4. GNU Radio implementation of the sniffer.
TABLE I. SNIFFING BENCHMARKS
Distance 1 ft 5 ft 10 ft 15 ft 20 ft 25 ft
Accuracy 97% 98% 92.5% 77% 70% 50%
which works in real time, i.e. while the program is running.
The solution to creating a sniffer that runs in real time is
using a pipe. With the current implementation that can write
the binary data of packets to a file, using a file that can be
simultaneously written to and read from is the most intuitive
option. Thus, the GNU Radio flow diagram for the implemen-
tation remains the same as the secondary implementation. The
only difference is that the flow diagram now outputs into a
file known as a FIFO. A FIFO is a method of piping data
in Linux operating systems. It is a file which requires both a
read and a write action operating on it simultaneously. When
that condition is met, the FIFO acts as a queue: first in, first
out. Binary data is pushed into this FIFO by GNU Radio and
the HackRF while a script reads and parses through the file,
deciphering it for packets, resulting in a sniffer that operates
in real time.
IV. BENCHMARKING AND ANALYSIS
For the sniffing attack, the benchmarking process is rather
intuitive. A well-functioning sniffer is one that has a high
accuracy of sniffing packets at great distances. Thus, the
scenario used to measure accuracy is as follows. The HackRF
One, i.e. the sniffer, is positioned at varying distances away
from the clicker. The clicker is then set to transmit a packet. If
the HackRF One receives and deciphers this packet correctly
(ID and payload must be correct), then the packet is considered
successfully sniffed. This experiment is performed at varying
distances, using two hundred trials for each respective distance.
The results of this benchmarking is displayed in Table 1.
To begin analysis, the goal of sniffing is to stealthily and
passively acquire knowledge of others’ answers and packet
submissions. According to benchmarking results, sniffing per-
forms quite well within a lecture hall or classroom setting.
Distances of 1 to 10 feet have an accuracy higher than 90
percent and distances 15 to 20 feet have an accuracy higher
than 70 percent. The accuracy drops below 50 percent at a
distance of 25 feet away from other clickers. We note that in
most scenarios, the user would be sitting near other clickers,
generally within a vicinity of 25 feet radius. Thus, the sniffing
attack is expected to receive most answers that are submitted
within the classroom if the sniffer is positioned near the center
of the classroom or lecture hall.
V. CONCLUSION
Given that the performance of the sniffing attack are found
to be practical and usable within classroom environments, it is
reasonable to discourage the use of the clickers for high-stake
assignments in classrooms and lecture halls. Although it is safe
to use these clickers for surveying and participation purposes,
the use of such devices for graded assignments bears the risks
of cheating within a class. This is even more true given that the
sniffer is found to work for all generations of the clicker. Note
that this does not apply only to clickers; it is reasonable to
conclude that using any audience response system for graded
assignments without knowledge of its security implementations
bears the risks of cheating.
Furthermore, the usage of software defined radio is gaining
popularity. Because of this, it is important to stay cautious
when using any radio-based devices. The clicker is just one
of many potentially exploitable devices. Wireless keyboards
and mouses can be popular targets as well, especially since it
is possible to sniff key strokes and mouse movements while
the user is operating with confidential information such as
paying bills, checking their bank balance, or logging into their
email account. In this new era of technology, it is always good
practice to ensure devices and programs are secure by checking
their security implementations.
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